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Abstract 
 
This diploma thesis investigates the persistency of active portfolio management. 
Persistency in the context of this thesis means that the performance of an 
active managed portfolio generates excess returns compared to a benchmark 
portfolio repeatedly. First, some basic concepts of capital markets theory are 
discussed, in particular the Efficient Market Hypothesis and the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. An overview on the methods and tools used for measuring 
performance is also given. Next, the topic is treated on the basis of three 
aspects: the comparison of the performance of active and passive managed 
portfolios, the distinction between skill and luck causing performance and the 
possibility of repeated outperformance. For this purpose, a historical review on 
the major studies on performance of active portfolio management is conducted. 
The results from the studies covered in the thesis strongly indicate that 
performance persistence of active managed portfolios is not possible in the long 
run. Finally, the limitations of previous research are disclosed and suggestions 
for future research are given. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of Active Portfolio Management, sometimes also referred to as 
Active Asset Management, is one of the most discussed and researched topics 
in the financial world over the last 50 years. Its importance can be explained by 
the fact that all players on the financial market, whether they believe in active 
management or not, are heavily influenced by it. 
 
Ever since the formation of capital markets, investors wanted to outperform their 
competitors, the market. Still their approach was more of a try and error basis 
as any academic concepts or methods were lacking. Systematic research on 
this topic only began in the 1960s and 1970s with the development of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) by Eugene Fama and the Capital Asset 
Pricing Modell (CAPM) by – amongst others – William Sharpe. 
 
Believers of an efficient market argue that it is impossible for active managers to 
beat the market in the long run and refer the debate to the findings of academic 
research that have come to the conclusion that overall active managers lack the 
necessary skills to consistently outperform the market. 
 
Yet, if all of that is true, why do active portfolio managers still play a significant 
role in the worldwide business of asset management? 
Moreover, as active portfolio management is considered to be amongst the 
highest paid jobs in the world, one would expect them to have a certain skill that 
is desired and sought after by society considering that one of the major 
principles of economics states that people only earn more than average when 
having a proficiency that is in high demand. 
So maybe there are indeed plausible explanations for the demand in skilled 
active managers after all. 
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During the last decades numerous studies have dealt with the topic of active 
management and their focus can be separated in three different questions: 
• Have active managers on average outperformed the market? 
• Did those active managers outperform the market because of their skills 
or were the just lucky? 
• Are active managers able to repeat their outperformance? 
 
Although this diploma thesis will also cover the first two questions mentioned 
above, its focus lies on the last question, the search for persistence in 
performance in active management. 
 
But before the answers to these questions will be explored later on, chapter two 
discusses some basic concepts of capital markets theory which are vital for the 
understanding of active management. 
In chapter three the two basic styles of active management, security selection 
and market timing, will be explored in detail. 
The next chapter will focus on the topics of performance analysis, in particular 
how active performance can be measured and attributed to the different styles. 
Finally, by having a look at previous studies on active management, answers to 
the questions raised above will be delivered in chapter five. 
 
In the end, it should be possible to determine whether active portfolio 
management can live up its promises and deliver the desired outcome of 
excess returns to investors continuously in the long run, thus giving an answer 
to the underlying question of this thesis: “Is active portfolio management able to 
achieve persistent outperformance?” 
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2. Foundations of Active Portfolio Management 
 
At the first look it might seem odd to start a thesis on active portfolio 
management with theories on efficient markets, which in a strict sense rule out 
the possibility to outperform the market, so basically there would be no need to 
explore active portfolio management any further. However, as the world is not 
always just black and white, the concept of efficient capital markets is in 
practice not as explicit as the theory suggests so it is worth taking a look into it 
within the context of active management. In addition this chapter covers the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Fundamental Law of Active Management, 
which was introduced by Grinold and Kahn, certainly the most high profile 
contribution in the development of active portfolio management theory. 
 
 
2.1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The efficiency of capital markets is not only one of the most controversial areas 
in investment research, but also has considerable real-world implications for 
portfolio managers and investors. 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis was developed in 1970 by Eugene Fama in an 
attempt to formalise earlier empirical studies on market efficiency, which in turn 
were based on the random walk hypothesis. For Fama a market is efficient 
when prices always fully reflect available information.1 
 
With other words: 
“An efficient capital market is one in which security prices adjust rapidly to the 
arrival of new information and therefore, the current prices of securities reflect 
all information about the security.”2 
 
                                            "!#$%$!&"'()*+!,-./.!0!123445+!6789:!&0)))*+!,-0"0!
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In his article in 1970 Fama also divided the general Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) and the empirical analysis of the hypothesis into three sub hypothesis 
depending on which degree of information is involved: the weak-form EMH, the 
semi strong-form EMH and the strong-form EMH. 
 
The weak-form hypothesis states that current stock prices already reflect all 
information that can be derived from examining market-generated data, such as 
past prices, rates of return, trading volume, etc. If the data from the past would 
give reliable information about future prices and as past prices are publicly 
available all market participants would have the same knowledge, so no one 
would be better off than the others.  Basically this hypothesis says that trend 
analysis is useless, because all investors would have learned to exploit future 
trends. 
 
The semi strong-form hypothesis states that all information that is publicly 
available is reflected in the stock price. Public available information refers to 
fundamental data on a firm’s products, management, balance sheet data, etc., 
in short information regarding the prospects of a company. All market 
information considered by the weak-form EMH is also taken into account, as 
this information is in any case available to the public. This hypothesis suggests 
that only investors who receive new information before it becomes common 
knowledge will produce above average returns, because once new information 
has become public, security prices will already reflect the news. 
 
The strong-form hypothesis asserts that all information that is relevant to a 
firm is reflected in security prices, even such information that is only available to 
company insiders. This means that no investor or group of investors has any 
superior knowledge over others, so actually no one should be able to achieve 
above average performance. The view of this hypothesis is quite an extreme 
one; moreover it is doubtful that any company insiders would be able to gain 
access to information long enough before it is released to the wider public to 
exploit their advance when trading on the information. 
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In fact many countries have imposed regulations against insider trading to 
ensure that all market participants have access to the same information at the 
same time, thus trying to achieve the ideal of efficient markets. 
Most of the early work on efficient capital markets was based on the random 
walk hypothesis, which states that changes in stock prices occur randomly. This 
means that the prices of a stock in a future period is the result of the price of the 
stock today plus a random error term: 
 
 
where: 
 = price of an asset at a future period t from today 
 = price of an asset today 
 = random error term between today and future period t. 
 
But which implications does the random walk hypothesis have on the theory of 
market efficiency? 
 
If we assume that stock prices incorporate all available information, they only 
rise or fall, when new information becomes available. New information, by 
definition, has to be unpredictable, because if it could be predicted, it would 
already be incorporated in the information already known. Given that, stock 
prices that change because of new information available, must also move 
unpredictably, which is the core argument of the random walk hypothesis, 
namely that stock prices changes will be unpredictable and randomly. If, 
however, the movements of stock prices were predictable, the weak-form 
efficient market hypothesis would be contradicted, as this would mean, that not 
all available information was reflected in the stock prices, thus giving clear 
evidence of stock market inefficiency.3 So with the use of the random walk 
hypothesis the weak-form efficient market hypothesis can be checked on its 
accuracy. 
 
                                            .!68;32!2<!$4-!&0))=*+!,-.("!
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Tests on the weak-form EMH were mostly looking for patterns in stock returns 
and the results of the majority of the studies supported the hypothesis. 
Tests for the semi strong-form EMH either involved event studies, in which 
research asked whether investors could gain above-average returns when they 
traded on the basis of publicly available information or it was investigated 
whether there are opportunities to predict future returns. In either case, results 
for both methods were mixed. In general, studies that looked for the possibility 
to predict future rates of return on the basis of key figures such as P/E ratios, 
size, earnings and the BV/MV ratio did not support the hypothesis. However, 
the results from the event studies clearly are in support of the semi strong-form 
EMH. 
Tests for the strong-form EMH concentrate on Value Line rankings and 
analysts’ recommendations. Their results vary from time to time, but at the 
moment seem to be in favour of the EMH. Yet, tests for two special groups of 
investors (stock exchange specialists and corporate insiders) did not in support 
the strong-form EMH, as apparently both groups have a monopoly on important 
information and use it achieve above-average returns. Research on the 
performance of professional fund managers, which will be covered in more 
detail in chapter five, generally turned out to be in support of the strong-form 
EMH.4 
 
 
2.2. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is based on the foundations of modern 
portfolio management by Markowitz and was later developed by amongst 
others Sharpe and is one of the models that have heavily influenced asset 
management, both in theory and practice. 
 
The CAPM is a set of predictions concerning equilibrium expected returns on 
risky assets and determines consensus expected returns. It implies that the risk 
                                            >!123445+!6789:!&0)))*+!,-0>?!
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premium on any asset or portfolio is the product of the risk premium on the 
market portfolio and the beta coefficient. 
The most familiar expression of the CAPM is the so-called expected return-beta 
relationship: 
 
 
where: 
 = expected return on an asset i 
 = rate of return on a risk-free asset 
 = slope term 
 = expected return on the market portfolio. 
 
The CAPM relates expected rates of return to risk and the expected risk 
premium on any asset is proportional to the expected risk premium on the 
market portfolio with beta as a proportionally constant. 
It should be noted that under the CAPM investors are only compensated for 
taking necessary risks, but not for unnecessary ones. 
 
Due to its characteristics, the CAPM is, however, impractical for the following 
reasons: 
• as the theoretical market portfolio includes every risky asset, it is 
unobservable in practice 
• expectations due to their nature are also unobservable. 
 
While the CAPM is a good enough model in the theory, in practice it is 
empirically not observable. A useful alternative model was therefore developed 
with the market model that overcomes the obstacle of unobservable variables. 
 
The underlying assumption of the market model is that the returns on a stock 
are directly related to the returns on a market index. The concept behind the 
market model states that the rate of return surprises on a stock is proportional 
E(Ri) = rf + βi · [E(RM )− rf ]
E(Ri)
rf
βi
E(RM )
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to the corresponding surprises on a market index5 with a proportionally constant 
!. 
This relationship is described with the following formula: 
 
 
where 
 = rate of return on an asset 
 = rate of return on a risk-free asset 
 = slope term 
 = rate of return on a market index 
 = random error term. 
It should be noted, that the term on the left hand side of the equation represents 
the excess return that can be achieved. 
 
The random error term ( ), also called residual, stands for the part of the 
security returns that cannot be explained by the market model. It can be seen 
as a random variable with a probability distribution where the mean is zero and 
a standard deviation of .6 
 
As beta gives the sensitivity of an asset’s returns to the market index’s returns, 
a beta greater than one means, that the asset’s returns are more volatile than 
the returns of the market index and a beta less than one means, that the asset’s 
returns are less volatile than the returns of the market index. 
 
The equation of the market model as stated above can be expanded by the 
factor alpha, so that 
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ri − rf = αi + βi · [rM − rf ] + ￿i
 9 
where: 
 = the difference between an asset’s expected return and ist benchmark 
return. 
 
If the alpha is systematically different from zero, the asset or portfolio fulfils the 
definition of active management. 
 
Although the CAPM and the market model are similar, there are two major 
differences between them: first, the market model is a single-factor model with 
the market index as the only factor, and second, the market model uses a 
market index instead of a market portfolio unlike the CAPM. 
 
 
2.3. The Fundamental Law of Active Management 
 
The fundamental law of active management was originally introduced by 
Grinold in 1989 and later further developed by Grinold and Kahn. It relates the 
breadth and level of skill of a portfolio manager to his or her potential to produce 
risk-adjusted returns. 7 
 
The law is based on the two attributes of a strategy, skill and breadth.  Breadth 
means the number of independent investment decisions that are made each 
year and skill is a measure for the quality of these decisions. 
The fundamental law of active management connects breadth and skill to the 
information ratio, which is a measure of a manager’s opportunities, through the 
formula8: 
 
 
Grinold and Kahn defined the parameters as follows: 
• “BR is the strategy’s breadth. Breadth is defined as the number of 
independent forecasts of exceptional return we make per year. 
                                            (!B73:84;+!C$A:!&0)""*+!,-"/!/!B73:84;+!C$A:!&0)))*+!,-">/!
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• IC is the manager’s information coefficient. This measure of skill is the 
correlation of each forecast with the actual outcomes. We have assumed 
for convenience that IC is the same for all forecasts.”9 
 
As with every model the fundamental law of active management is based on 
some assumptions, which do not quite hold in practice.  
First, it is assumed that all forecast are independent from each other, because if 
the information sources are dependent, the overall level of skill will become 
lower. 
Secondly, it is also assumed that every active bet has the same level of skill; 
however in reality managers will most likely have greater skill in one area over 
another. 
The third and most important assumption states that a portfolio manager will 
always accurately appreciate the value of information he or she receives and 
thus build a portfolio which uses the information most optimal and efficiently. 10 
 
As Grinold and Kahn are eager to stress the fundamental law of active 
management was not designed as an operational tool, but to deliver insight into 
active management, which lessons can be drawn form it? 
If – for example - one wants to increase one’s information ration from 0.5 to 1.0, 
one has these options in order to achieve this goal: either by doubling the skill, 
by increasing the breadth by a factor of four or some combination of the 
previous options. Basically to be successful a portfolio manager needs to know 
the trade-offs between increasing the breadth of the strategy - by either 
covering more stocks or shortening the time horizons of the forecasts – and 
improving skill. As it is generally agreed on that the information ratio should be 
maximised by an active manager, the conclusion from the fundamental law of 
active management is that it is important to play often – resulting in a high BR – 
and to play well – causing high IC11 - to win at the investment management 
game.  
 
                                            '!3D3;-!")!B73:84;+!C$A:!&0)))*+!,-"=(!""!3D3;-!
 11 
One interesting feature of the fundamental law of active management is that is 
additive in the square information ratio as shown by the following formula12: 
 
 
 
where: 
BR1 = breath of asset or portfolio 1 
BR2 = breath of asset or portfolio 2 
IC1 = information coefficient of asset or portfolio 1 
IC2 = information coefficient of asset or portfolio 2 
 
This means that the law of active management can be applied to two or more 
asset classes as well as to two or more portfolio managers, which is especially 
useful for investors who want to spread risk by investing in a fund of funds, 
although in this case we have to assume that the allocation across the portfolio 
managers is the optimum. 
 
 
Despite being one of the most important contributions in the development of 
active portfolio management, the fundamental law of active management has a 
weak point: breadth. The major shortcoming with the definition used by Grinold 
and Kahn (2000) is that breadth is difficult to specify. 
The law of active management per se describes an ex ante relationship. But 
while the realized IR and IC can be measured ex post, and therefore be 
examined as specific concepts ex ante as well, this does not apply to breadth, 
leading to disparity between the three terms of the equation. The problem with 
breadth is that the number of decisions per year is not equal to the number of 
portfolio holdings.13 
 
In an attempt to provide more insight into breadth Grinold and Kahn (2011) 
refine their law in the context of a dynamic model. 
                                            "0!B73:84;+!C$A:!&0)))*+!,-"=>!".!B73:84;+!C$A:!&0)""*+!,-"/!
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The model is based on three assumptions: 
• “The forecasting power of information decays exponentially at a known 
rate g. (!) 
• The information process is in equilibrium so that old information decaying 
and new information arriving are in balance. (!) information arrives at 
the same rate g, which we call the information turnover rate. 
• The portfolio manager understands the dynamic nature of the information 
process and uses that knowledge to make optimal asset return 
forecasts.”14 
 
 
The new definition of breadth is given by the following equation, with g being 
the rate of information turnover and N assets15: 
 
 
 
Given that the information coefficient (IC) depends on the effective skill level k 
and the information turnover rate g, the formula for the dynamic model of the 
fundamental law of active management states16: 
 
 
 
The adapted formula is an attempt to better understand skill and breadth in the 
context of an equilibrium information process, where old information is replaced 
immediately by new information. 
 
The most important finding from analysing the new concept is that when the 
information process is in equilibrium the rate at which information becomes out 
dated must equal the rate at which new information becomes available. This is 
called information turnover rate and can be measured for any investment 
                                            ">!B73:84;+!C$A:!&0)""*+!,-"'!"=!3D3;-!"?!ED3;-!
BR = g · N
IR = k · √g · N
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process. The other important step forward is that within the equilibrium dynamic 
model the previously vague definition of breadth is replaced by the quite 
specific definition of it being the number of assets times the information turnover 
rate.17 
 
                                            "(!B73:84;+!C$A:!&0)""*+!,-0(!
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3. Active Portfolio Management Styles 
 
Active portfolio managers do not believe that security markets are efficient and 
hence, do not act on that principle. They think that there are mispriced 
securities or groups of securities in the market from time to time. Put short, their 
forecasts and expectations of risk and return on securities differ from the 
general opinion in the market.18 
 
A portfolio manager is only able to make three different decisions that are very 
likely to influence the returns and the performance of his portfolio into different 
directions, probably favourable for him, probably not. These are: 
 
• Security selection, which means an active choice of a particular security 
within an asset class. 
• Market timing, this is an active decision to over – or underweight a 
specific asset class in contrast to the “normal” (long–term) allocation. 
• Investment policy, which is commonly referred to as “asset allocation”; 
unlike the two previous decisions this one is not optional. One has to 
have an asset allocation, whether knowingly or not. 
 
A more detailed description of the different investment styles mentioned above 
is given in Figure 1 on the next page. It also shows how the different styles can 
be combined together and how they engage with each other, which will be 
explained in more detail in the next chapter “security selection”. 
 
Although asset allocation is an integral part of active portfolio management, this 
chapter will focus only on security selection and market timing as they are 
commonly referred to when talking about active portfolio management styles. 
Furthermore, the topic of asset allocation is so vast that it would exceed by far 
the extent of this thesis. 
                                            "/!@A$7,2!2<!$4-!&"'''*+!,-/))!
 15 
 
Figure 1: Investment styles. 
Source: Sharpe et al., Investments, 1999, p.802 
 
3.1. Security Selection 
 
In an ideal world before deciding where to invest an investment manager should 
make forecasts for all available securities concerning their expected returns, 
 16 
standard deviations and co-variances between the securities. Afterwards an 
efficient set could be generated, which further in connection with the 
indifference curves of each client would allow the manager to invest exactly in 
those securities that build the optimal portfolio for the particular client.19 This 
process could be seen as the most original form of security selection, because 
as was stated before security selection is the decision of how an asset class 
portfolio should be invested in each of the available securities making up the 
asset class. 
However, in reality this has probably never been done by anyone, because 
although this selection would allow the manager to have the most detailed 
information available, it is simple not practicable as the costs for obtaining the 
information would be enormous and one also has to take the time constraint 
into account. 
 
A more feasible approach of security selection is therefore to combine it with the 
process of asset allocation. Here, the manager first decides in which asset 
classes to invest in general. Then the parameters as mentioned before are 
calculated for all securities, which are to be considered in each asset class 
chosen before. Then the process is conducted like above. The important 
difference, however, is that the co-variances between the individual securities in 
each asset class are not taken into account when the optimal portfolio is 
constructed. This selection process is then described as myopic resulting in 
each asset class being an individual portfolio. 
Afterwards the asset allocation process comes into use, which means that it is 
decided to invest the client’s money into a certain number of asset class 
portfolios like the ones derived above. At this point however the manager needs 
to know the expected return and the standard deviation for the “portfolios” as 
well as the co-variances between them to allow him to choose the optimal 
combination of the “portfolios”. 
 
Furthermore the two – stage process of security selection and asset allocation 
can be extended by introducing groups or sectors within the asset classes. In 
                                            "'!@A$7,2!2<!$4-!&"'''*+!,-/)"!
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general the process is done similarly to the done described before. The major 
difference is that the investment manager goes further into detail by dividing 
each of the asset classes he has chosen before into different groups. Then he 
would calculate the relevant parameters for the securities within the groups, 
again resulting in the construction of different group “portfolios” and finally 
determining the appropriate combination of the groups within every asset class. 
The final portfolio for the client is than chosen with help of asset allocation as in 
the two – stage process. 
Though the advantage of security selection on its own is certainly the in – depth 
information on every asset, the process of obtaining the information in the first 
place, let alone the thought that this would have to be repeated every time the 
client’s portfolio is readjusted, makes it quite impracticable for use in real 
decision making outside the world of theory. 
 
 
3.2. Market Timing 
 
The only other option – besides security selection- an investment manager has 
to actively influence the performance of a portfolio is through market timing, 
which means the decision to over – or underweight certain asset classes 
compared to the long–run allocation. In a simple way this means, “the only 
active decision concerns the appropriate allocation of funds between a 
surrogate market portfolio (usually consisting of either stocks or long–term 
bonds) and a risk free asset, such as Treasury bills.” 20In other words, the 
manager changes the mix of risky and risk free assets based on forecasts 
concerning the expected return and the risk of “the market”, i.e. usually the 
market portfolio, compared to the risk free rate, independently from the markets 
view. Reality is nonetheless more complex and complicated than that. Most 
commonly managers not only decided to change the weights of the risky and 
risk free assets within a portfolio, but over – or underweight the different asset 
classes of which the portfolio consist. 
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Perfect foresight on market timing can be seen as the equivalent of holding a 
call option on an equity portfolio. We know that a perfect market timer will 
always invest 100% in either the equity portfolio or the risk-free asset, 
depending on which of the two offers the higher return.  
The rate of return for a perfect market timer is shown in Figure 2 by the constant 
black line, which looks exactly as the pay-off profile of a long call option. 
 
 
Figure 2: Rate of return of a perfect market timer. 
Source: Bodie et al., Investments, 2005, p.987 
To examine this phenomenon in more detail, we assume that the market index 
is at S0 and there is a call option on the same index with an exercise price of X 
= S0(1+rf). If the market outperforms the risk-free rate, ST will exceed X, and 
vice versa if the market’s performance is lower than the risk-free rate ST will be 
less than X. So, if the market return is less than the risk-free rate, the perfect 
timer’s portfolio will pay the risk-free return, as the value of the “call option” is 
zero. However, when the market beats the risk-free asset, the perfect timer gets 
the market return.21 
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Hence, however the market will move, with the ability to predict whether to 
invest in risky assets or the risk-free rate at any given point in time, one will 
always at least generate the return from the risk-free rate. 
 20 
4. Performance Analysis 
 
The ultimate goal of performance analysis is to separate skilled portfolio 
managers from unskilled ones. For this purpose, a number of techniques were 
developed, which help an investor or portfolio manager gain insight, how well 
he or she really performed. But although performance measurement is an 
important part of successful active management, portfolio managers and 
investors are keener to know, which strategy used by the portfolio management 
is responsible for the performance of a portfolio. 
This chapter gives an overview on the different ways on can use to measure 
performance as well as an introduction to performance attribution. Finally, it 
briefly describes the concept of style analysis. 
 
 
4.1. Performance Measurement 
 
Analysing portfolio returns is not a straightforward task, as it seems to be, as 
returns have to be adjusted for risk before they can be compared in a 
meaningful way. The easiest way to evaluate the performance of a certain 
portfolio is to pick portfolios with similar characteristics and rank them according 
to their performance, as this tells one how the portfolio in question has 
performed relative to its competitors. The biggest problem with these peer 
group comparisons though is that they do not take into account the risk taken 
by the portfolio manager. All in all, this is not a very sound methodology and 
results gained from it can be misleading. 
A more sophisticated method of performance evaluation is to use a risk-
adjusted performance measure based on mean-variance criteria. Today, the 
most used and well-known risk-adjusted performance measures are: 
 
1. Treynor’s measure 
2. Sharpe’s measure 
3. Jensen’s measure 
4. Information ratio 
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They will be examined in more detail below. It should be noted, that for all 
measures the rate of return is defined as the average rate of return, not the 
expected rate of return. 
 
Treynor was the first, who used a composite measure, which included a risk 
component while examining returns. He divided the risk into two factors: risk 
that is caused by market volatility and risk that is caused by the volatility from 
securities or the portfolio. Treynor’s measure is based on the CAPM and it 
follows the idea that a risk-free asset combined with different portfolios creates 
a portfolio possibility line. In short, it compares portfolio performance to the 
security market line (SML). The slope of the portfolio possibility line is 
 
 
 
where: 
 = the average rate of return for a portfolio during a specified time period 
 = the average rate of return on a risk-free asset during the same time period 
 = the slope of the portfolio’s characteristic line during that time period. 
 
Treynor showed that risk-averse investors prefer larger slope portfolio possibility 
lines. While the numerator represents the risk premium for an investor, the ! is 
a measure of risk the investor is prepared to take on. In short, Treynor’s 
measure gives the excess return per unit of risk an investor gains and thus, risk-
averse investors will want to maximize it. 
The major shortcoming of Treynor’s measure is its use of systematic risk 
instead of total risk, like the Sharpe ratio. Due to the disregard of unsystematic 
risk, it is advisable to use the measure only on well-diversified portfolios for 
which the influence of unsystematic risk can be neglected. 
 
 
The risk measure invented by Sharpe is largely based on his work on the 
CAPM, in particular his theory on the capital market line (CML). Sharpe’s 
r¯P
r¯f
βP
T = (r¯p−r¯f )βp
 22 
measure gives the total risk of a portfolio by including the standard deviation of 
the returns of the assets. As can be seen from the formula, 
 
where: 
 = the average rate of return for a portfolio during a specified time period 
 = the average rate of return on a risk-free asset during the same time period 
 = the standard deviation of the rate of return for a portfolio during the time 
period. 
 
It shows the risk premium an investor earns per unit of total risk he or she takes 
on. The best portfolio is the one with the highest Sharpe ratio as it accounts for 
the highest risk-adjusted performance. 
Sharpe’s measure is more complex than the one from Treynor as it evaluates 
the influence of both, the rate of return achieved by a portfolio manager and the 
diversification used to accomplish the rate of return. 
Although Sharpe and Treynor are quite similar in their approach of performance 
measurement, the major difference between the two is their view on risk. While 
both performance measures will produce the same results for completely 
diversified portfolios by delivering identical rankings of the portfolios in question, 
as the total variance of the diversified portfolio is its systematic variance, this 
does not apply for not that well diversified portfolios.22 Given that the two 
performance measures will most likely offer differences in ranking portfolios 
according to their risk-adjusted performance, it is feasible to use them both. 
 
 
The third alternative to measure performance by Jensen is also based on the 
CAPM and thus similar to the two methods discussed before. It is especially 
close to Treynor by equally including the systematic risk, represented by !. 
Jensen’s measure gives the alpha value of a portfolio, as can be seen from the 
formula: 
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αp = r¯p − [r¯f + βp(r¯M − r¯f )]
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where: 
 = the average rate of return for a portfolio during a specified time period 
 = the average rate of return on a risk-free asset during the same time period 
 = the systematic risk for a portfolio 
 = the average rate of return for the market (benchmark) portfolio during the 
same time period. 
 
The equation shows the rate of return during a given period of time as a linear 
function of the risk-free rate of return plus a risk premium is added. Jensen’s 
measure tells how much of the rate of return achieved is attributable to a 
manager’s skill to generate above-average risk-adjusted returns. 
As it depends on the systematic risk, its use – like the Treynor measure – is 
only recommended for well-diversified portfolios. The other major disadvantage 
is that only a comparison to a market portfolio is possible, but not to different 
other portfolios, so one cannot rank portfolios with this measure. 
 
 
Contrary to the others, the last performance measure, called information ratio or 
appraisal ratio, does not originate from the CAPM. It measures the excess 
average return of a portfolio compared to an accordant benchmark, mostly 
consisting of comparable portfolios, divided by the standard deviation of excess 
return, as the formula shows: 
 
 
where: 
 = the excess return for a portfolio over the benchmark portfolio during a 
specified time period 
 = the standard deviation of the excess return during the period. 
 
While the numerator states a manager’s ability to generate returns that are 
different from the benchmark, the denominator shows the unsystematic risk that 
occurs when looking for the excess returns. Often the information ratio is 
r¯P
r¯f
βP
r¯M
αP
σ(eP )
IR = αpσ(ep)
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interpreted as a benefit-to-cost-ratio. " is sometimes also referred to a tracking 
error, which represents the costs of active management. 
According to Grinold and Kahn the information ratio idealistically lies between 
0.5 and 1.0, where an investor achieving 0.5 is considered to be very good and 
an information ratio of 1.0 is exceptional.23 
 
 
As all four performance measures have their advantages and disadvantages, it 
is best to use at least two of them at the same time to measure a portfolio’s 
performance, as the application of only one might not give an exact picture of 
the performance. 
 
 
4.2. Performance Attribution 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a portfolio manager has two options to 
generate performance higher than the market, security selection or market 
timing. Hence, it is logical that he manager itself, but also any investor will want 
to know, to which strategy the performance can be attributed to.  
With the help of attribution analysis, it is possible to determine, which factor 
(market timing and security selection) drives the overall performance of a 
portfolio. 
The method compares a benchmark portfolio performance to the portfolio 
performance and decomposes the result into an allocation effect and a 
selection effect. The benchmark portfolio is called bogey (B) 24  and in 
mathematical term the effects are written as 
 
Allocation Effect = #I [(wPi – wBi) * rBi] 
Selection Effect = #I [(wPi) * (rPi – rBi ] 
where: 
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wBi, wPi = the investment proportions given to the i-th market segment (e.g. 
asset class) in the benchmark portfolio and the manager’s actual 
portfolio 
rBi, rPi = the investment return to the i-th market segment in the benchmark 
portfolio and the manager’s actual portfolio 
 
The allocation effect is a measure for how successful a portfolio manager’s 
decisions to over- or underweight a particular market segment were, on the 
basis of the segment’s return relative to the benchmark return. 
The selection effect is a measure for a manager’s skill to select these market 
segments that produce higher returns than the corresponding segments of the 
benchmark, weighted by the size of the actual market segment within the 
portfolio. 
 
In sum, the two factors describe the overall contribution of an asset class to the 
total portfolio performance. 
 
Usually attribution studies decompose performance by starting with very broad 
asset allocation choices and then further narrowing it down to the security 
choices. 
In practice, a performance attribution analysis might focus on three 
components: “(1) broad asset market allocation choices across equity, fixed-
income, and money markets; (2) industry (sector) choice within each market; 
and (3) security choice within each sector.”25 
 
Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) addressed in their paper the question of 
how one could measure the performance contribution of the activities that are 
part of the investment management process, namely investment policy, security 
selection and market timing. However, the relative importance of those factors 
could only be measured with a relevant model, which attributes the returns to 
the factors. Based on historical investment data of US corporate pension plans, 
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their goal was to establish, which investment decisions had the largest impact 
on the total return. 
 
For this purpose they developed a simple, but powerful framework to analyse 
the portfolio returns, shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brinson et al., Determinants of Portfolio Performance, 1986, p.40 
 
Quadrant I in this model stands for the policy which is a funds benchmark 
return, which is a consequence of the investment policy developed with a client. 
Quadrant II represents the return effects of policy and timing, whereas 
Quadrant III stands for the returns, which come from the policy and security 
selection. Finally, Quadrant IV gives the actual return of the portfolio as a 
Figure 3: Simplified Framework for Return Accountability 
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whole. It is the outcome of the actual segment returns and the segment 
weights. 
 
Among the most striking findings was that on average active management costs 
an average portfolio 1.10% per year, although the results for individual 
portfolios varied greatly, ranging from – 4.17% up to + 3.99 %. Following their 
results they came to the conclusion that though active management is 
important, the bigger proportion of return comes from the investment policy. In 
other words, “it is the normal asset class weights and the passive asset classes 
themselves that provide the bulk of return to a portfolio.”26 
 
 
They also examined the relative amount of variance that was contributed to the 
total return of the portfolio by each quadrant. Of course the total performance 
explains itself 100%, but the surprising result was that the investment policy 
return explained almost 94% of the total return on average, whereas returns 
due to timing and policy as well as those coming from policy and security 
selection added only humbly (between two and four per cent). Those results 
altogether clearly show that that the total return of a portfolio is to a large extend 
dominated by the investment policy decisions, which is why an investor or 
manager should put a lot of emphasise on getting the right policy first, as 
neither security selection nor timing are able to correct possible losses that will 
occur due to having chosen the wrong investment policy in the first step. 
 
 
However, in recent years other authors have challenged the approach and 
results that Brinson et al. found in their study, in particular Kritzmann and Page 
(2003) as well as in the paper of Kritzmann (2006). They state that it can be 
quite dangerous to draw any conclusion concerning the relative importance of 
security selection and asset allocation using the method of Brinson et al. They 
used a normative approach based on a bootstrap simulation to establish 
whether there is a hierarchy among asset allocation and security selection. 
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Their model is designed to split investor behaviour from investment opportunity. 
They therefore rather look for potential than realized portfolio returns. Generally, 
they conclude that security selection is the most important decision an investor 
can take, whereas asset allocation is the least important choice, so basically 
they turn the findings of Brinson et al. upside down. 
 
 
4.3. Style Analysis 
 
The concept of style analysis was first introduced by William Sharpe. The basic 
idea behind it was that asset allocation accounts for the majority of variability in 
portfolio returns. Sharpe used an asset class factor model that captures the 
portfolio style and hence provides a style-specific benchmark. The paper’s 
approach was to regress fund returns on indices, with each index representing 
a number of asset classes. The regression coefficient on each index is used as 
a measure for the implication of the asset allocation on the styles. The 
regression coefficient has to be zero or a positive value in any case, as it is 
assumed that typically mutual funds cannot take short positions, and the sum of 
all regression coefficients has to be 100% as otherwise the asset allocation 
would be incomplete. The factor model uses 12 different asset class (style) 
portfolios and the returns on the asset classes are measured against publicly 
available, often used indices. 
 
 
Using the monthly returns on the Fidelity Magellan Fund between 1985 and 
1989, Sharpe’s result showed that out of the 12 asset classes only four of them 
had a positive regression coefficient. He came to the conclusion that the returns 
of the fund thus could be explained by only those four asset classes (growth 
stocks, medium-cap stocks, small stocks and European stocks). Moreover, the 
four styles account for 97.3% of the total performance.27 
 
 
                                            0(!@A$7,2!&"''0*+!,-""!
 29 
Sharpe’s findings were further supported by a study by Brinson et al. (1991), in 
which the authors came to the conclusion that the different returns of the 82 
funds used in their sample could by explained with 91.5% by their asset 
allocation.28 Later research even suggested that as much as 97% of fund 
returns could be explained by the asset allocation of the funds.29 
Style analysis as defined by Sharpe is also called return-based style analysis. It 
is an attempt to: “explain the variability in the observed returns to a security 
portfolio in terms of the movements in the returns to a series of benchmark 
portfolios designed to capture the essence of a particular security 
characteristic.”30 
In short, it determines the relationship between a portfolio and indices 
representing specific investment styles. 
The goal of style analysis is to better understand what influences a portfolio’s 
performance. It also allows classifying a portfolio’s strategy when compared to 
other portfolios. 
 
 
An alternative to Sharpe’s model of style analysis is the use of a style grid as 
shown in Figure 4. Usually, with this model the performance of a portfolio is 
classified in two dimensions: value vs. growth factor and the firm size factor 
(small or large cap). 
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Figure 4: Example of a style grid. 
Source: Fidelity Management and Research Company 
For example, in the figure above the black dot in the left quadrant of the lower 
row represents a portfolio that produces returns that can be best reproduced by 
indexes representing a small-cap value style. 
 
 
Though whichever method one uses for style analysis, it is important to pick the 
appropriate benchmark, as the used benchmark portfolio should be as 
consistent as possible with the style a portfolio applies, in order to obtain 
meaningful results from style analysis. Other criteria that should be considered 
when selecting a benchmark for a portfolio are: 
• easy to measure 
• realistic investment alternative to the active managed portfolio 
• as uncorrelated as possible to other style indices31 
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Using these guidelines, in practice there are almost an unlimited number of 
benchmarks to choose from. The most common and widespread used 
approaches in creating a benchmark portfolio are the following: 
 
Sharpe: uses portfolios of T-bills, intermediate-term government bonds, long-
term government bonds, corporate bonds, mortgage-related securities, large-
capitalization value stocks, large-capitalization growth stocks, medium 
capitalization stocks, small-capitalization stocks, non-US bonds, European 
stocks, Japanese stocks  
 
Ibbotson Associates: uses portfolios based on five characteristics: cash, large 
capitalization growth, small-capitalization growth, large-capitalization value, 
small-capitalization value 
 
BARRA: uses portfolios based on 13 characteristics: variability in markets, past 
firm success, firm size, trading activity, growth orientation, earnings-to-price 
ratio, book-to-price ratio, earnings variability, financial leverage, foreign income, 
labour intensity, yield, low capitalization32 
 
Style analysis is not only a helpful tool to determine which type of investment 
behaviour a portfolio manager uses, but it also gives clues about whether the 
portfolio manager is able to keep the style consistent over time or whether the 
style changes – knowingly or not. 
 
                                            .0!6789:+!123445!&0)))*+!,-'"?!
 32 
5. Active Management Performance: A Historical 
Review 
 
For more than half a century now, numerous studies on active managers’ 
performance have been conducted. At the very forefront of this research were 
the studies from Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1986). Since then 
most studies have focused on the active-passive mutual fund discussion. 
 
Over the years research on active management performance tried to find 
answers to the following questions: 
• Have active managers on average outperformed the market? 
• Did those active managers outperform the market because of their skills 
or were the just lucky? 
• Are active managers able to repeat their outperformance? 
 
Although the answers to these questions are very likely connected with each 
other, it is worth noting that even if previous research shows that active 
managers on average cannot beat the market, active management overall is 
impossible. 
By looking at some studies out of the extensive academic research into the 
topic of active management performance, this chapter tries to answer the 
questions stated above. 
 
But before we take a look at the comparison between active and passive 
management, we need to understand what is meant by this terms. The topic of 
active management and the strategies a portfolio manager can use have been 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter, so we will only examine the concept 
of passive management in this section. 
With passive management, securities are held for relatively long periods with 
only small and infrequent changes. Portfolio managers who follow a passive 
strategy mainly act as if security markets are relatively efficient. In principle, two 
passive portfolio strategies exist, indexing or buy-and-hold approach. 
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As discussed in the chapter on market efficiency, lots of empirical studies have 
shown that the majority of managers are not able to match the risk-return 
performance of stock or bond indices. Thus, many investors prefer to index their 
portfolio, meaning the portfolio manager builds a portfolio that will exactly match 
a selected bond or stock market index. When analysing the performance, the 
manager is not judged on risk and return relative to an index, but how closely 
he or she can match the index by examining the tracking error, which measures 
the difference between the return of the portfolio and the return of the market 
index.33 
 
The other option is to peruse a buy-and-hold strategy, which is actually the 
simplest portfolio strategy of all. It is used principally in bond portfolios and 
means that the portfolio manager picks bonds with certain features such as 
coupon levels, terms to maturity or durations which are based on the objectives 
and constraints of the client for which the portfolio is built, all the while it is its 
intention to hold the bonds until maturity. 
 
 
5.1. The Active vs Passive Debate 
 
Firm believers of efficient markets argue that it is impossible to outperform the 
market because according to the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis 
the market incorporates already all information available, thus no market 
participant has superior knowledge than the competitors. Yet, apparently some 
portfolio managers are able to produce better performance than others.  
 
Among the principal papers that evaluated fund performance on a large scale 
are Jensen (1968), Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Malkiel (1995)34. Their 
results are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Mutual fund performance. 
Source: Anderson, Ahmed, Mutual funds, 2005, p.14 
As the table shows their results are consistent in showing that active managed 
funds do not outperform market benchmarks as the negative alphas state. 
 
Jensen (1968) was the first paper that measured the absolute performance of 
mutual funds through the use of a model that statistically measured a fund’s 
performance relative to a benchmark. His findings show that the funds on 
average earned 1.1% less than what one would have expected due to their 
level of systematic risk. He also looked at the statistical significance of alpha 
and found that only the performance of three funds was significantly positive at 
5%, while 14 funds were negative at the 5% level. He drew the conclusion that 
the evidence points to the fact that funds’ performance is little more than mere 
chance.35 
 
 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989) shifted the focus of their research on the topic of 
survivorship bias and transaction costs and in contrast to previous studied they 
used both gross portfolio returns and actual returns when testing for abnormal 
returns. The most important findings of the study were that survivorship bias 
was about 0.5% annually and that transaction costs that were 2.5% annually 
are inversely connected to a fund’s size. They also discovered that abnormal 
gross performance was inversely related to a fund’s size and on average they 
did not discover any proof for actual returns to be positively abnormal.36 
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In his study Malkiel (1995) examines performance, persistence of performance, 
survivorship bias and expenses of equity mutual funds by looking for signs that 
there were times in history when markets were not as efficient as they were 
suspected to be. By using the CAPM model to calculate the alpha of the funds, 
as a measure of excess performance he finds alpha to be -0.06% on average 
and that it differs insignificantly from zero. There is also no relationship between 
the total returns and the betas, meaning that investors who want higher returns 
will not achieve them by investing in high-beta mutual funds. In contrast to the 
findings of Grinblatt and Titman, in Malkiel’s study the survivorship bias is 
distinctively higher with 15.69%; Malkiel attributes the difference in the results to 
the fund sample used by Grinblatt and Titman.37 
 
 
Gruber (1996) was puzzled by the fact that actively managed mutual funds 
grew so fast, when earlier findings on their performance suggested that on 
average the performance of active managed funds was inferior to that of index 
funds. 
Given these not so encouraging results about active management’s 
performance, Gruber lists four reasons why investors might still choose to put 
their money in active managed mutual funds: 38  
• Customer service 
• Low transaction costs 
• Benefits from diversification 
• Professional portfolio management 
 
As the first three reasons are also provided by index funds, it is the argument of 
the fourth one that separates active from passive managed funds. However, 
considering that the most important reason for picking a portfolio manager 
certainly is its performance, active managed fund will only appeal to investors, if 
they can deliver excess returns. 
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His sample consisted of 270 mutual funds and he used three ways to judge 
performance, returns relative to the market, risk adjusted returns from a single 
index model and risk-adjusted returns from a four index model. 
As one can see from the results for the monthly average performance of an 
average mutual fund given in Table 3 in the appendix, mutual funds always 
underperformed the benchmark. When looking at the numbers in more detail 
we see in the first column that for unadjusted returns mutual funds 
underperformed the market by 0.16 per cent a month, which is by 1.94 per cent 
a year. For the single index model the risk adjusted returns (column two) are 
given as -0.13 per cent a month, in total -1.56 per cent a year. The results from 
the four-index model are slightly better, suggesting that mutual funds 
underperform the market by 0.054 basis points per month (column five), which 
is by 0.65 per cent a year.39 
 
From these findings Gruber drew the conclusion – given that the expense ratio 
for his sample was on average 1.13 per cent and mutual funds underperformed 
a weighted average of indices by roughly 65 basis points per year – that 
although active management is likely to add value for the investor, mutual funds 
do charge an investor more than the added value.40 
 
 
Although the majority of studies on mutual fund performance concluded that 
actively managed funds on average do not manage to outperform passively 
managed funds, active managed funds continue to be popular amongst 
investors. Based on this contradictory behaviour, Wermers (2000) asked 
whether mutual fund managers who actively trade stocks add value. 
 
Wermers used a dataset that merged data from the CRSP database with data 
from CDA Investment Technologies in order to obtain a full record of each 
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fund’s key figures, including information on net assets under management, net 
returns, turnover ratio and expense ratio.41 
 
Notable findings of the study include that trading activity within the funds had 
doubled from 1975 to 1994 and that growth funds were the most popular 
segment of all mutual funds. On average mutual funds stocks outperformed the 
market index by 130 basis points per year, although this is approximately the 
same amount as expenses and transaction costs combined. While the stocks 
within the funds on average managed to outperform corresponding benchmarks 
by 71 basis points per year, the average net return for the funds was 100 basis 
points lower than the CRSP index. Yet, when net returns were compared to the 
Vanguard 500 Index actively managed funds outperformed it.42 
 
A popular claim by supporters of the concept of market efficiency is that it is 
impossible for active managed funds to outperform those which track an index 
passively over the long run and when adjusted for risk factors. Moreover the 
topic of what qualifies as a risk factor is a source of discussion within the 
academic environment. Still, studies of fund performance, especially by Carhart 
(1997) and Wermers (2000) agreed on that the alpha of an average mutual fund 
is negative when one adjusts the data for equity styles, which are known to be 
related to the cross-section of average equity returns, used by the fund. 
The primary question in this debate is whether portfolio managers should be 
allowed to take the credit for investing in certain styles of stock such as value 
stocks or small-capitalization stocks, during long time periods when those styles 
accounted for high returns.43 
 
Within active management, a topic of great interest to investors is whether 
excess fund return volatility is rewarded with higher average returns. One would 
expect that portfolios with a higher total volatility or with significant non-market 
volatility to outperform both, active managers with a smaller tracking error and 
those that simply follow an index. 
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Wermers (2003) addressed this question by examining the cross-sectional 
relation between returns and volatility of US mutual funds, especially looking at 
the trade-off between risk and reward that investors can expect from mutual 
funds. He looked at the issue “whether the cross-sectional variation in U.S. 
mutual fund returns is driven by managers taking bigger portfolio bets when 
they have superior stockpicking skills, or whether this variation is simply a by-
product of changing stock volatility or mandated investment constraints.”44 
In the paper Wermers studies the relations between returns (both, average and 
S&P-adjusted ones) and risk as well as the relations between mutual fund alpha 
and risk. He also looked into the interactions of style-adjusted fund alpha and 
risk. 
In general, the results show a positive correlation between the level of risk 
taken by mutual funds and their performance. 
However, although the findings point to a significant positive correlation 
between risk and performance for the majority of time, there were some sub 
periods during which the higher risk fund did not always beat their less risky 
competitors. Wermers finally concludes that active management does indeed 
provide value for an investor, but that the value is only reflected in some funds 
that take high volatility bets. 45 
 
An interesting aspect in the debate on whether active managed funds are 
superior over index funds or not is the role of market cyclicality. Usually public 
opinion on whether an investor is better off with an active or passive managed 
fund depends on if at the moment the majority of actively managed funds 
outperformances the market or not. 
However, as leadership of active or passive managed funds changes quite 
regularly, investors are often indecisive which alternative offers them the higher 
returns. Consequently, the question ensues why the leadership changes can be 
so dramatically? 
Philips and Kinniry of the Vanguard Group explored this question in their 
research paper from 2009 titled “The Active-Passive Debate: Market Cyclicality 
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and Leadership Volatility”. They began by posing the question whether a time 
span of ten years already qualifies as a sufficient long-term investment horizon. 
As depicted in Figure 5 they looked at how active managers’ net excess returns 
over the market benchmark were distributed. In the ten-year period ending with 
December 31, 1999, we see that only 31% of all managers outperformed the 
market. 
However, when looking at the ten-year period ending with December 31, 2008, 
we discover that 69% of fund managers were able to outperform the market that 
is more than twice the number than in the first period. This drastic shift in the 
return distribution not only implies that a ten-year period is not long enough to 
be considered long term, but it also raises the question what caused the shift in 
performance leadership.46 
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Figure 5: Performance leadership can shift over ten-year periods. 
Source: Source: Philips, Kinniry, The Active-Passive Debate: Market Cyclicality and Leadership 
Volatility, 2009, p.2 
When further examining the historic spreads between large- and small-
capitalization stocks and between growth and value stocks, Philips and Kinniry 
noted that simultaneously to the change of funds delivering outperformance 
from the period ending 1999 to the period ending 2008, performance leadership 
shifted from growth to value stocks. As the bull market of large-cap-growth 
stocks of the 1990s ended, outperformance came from small-cap stocks and 
value stocks.  
Philips and Kinniry further questioned whether the market environment was 
possibly having a bigger impact on the performance of a fund than the 
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managers’ skill. To evaluate the performance of active managers they divided 
the funds into segments according to the managers’ strategies such as size and 
style. 
It is assumed that an active manager following a style segment which 
outperforms any other segment and even the market itself, will more easily 
outperform the market as the outperformance of the style already accounts for a 
significant part of the manager’s outperformance. 
 
 
Figure 6: Relative ranking of style box total returns. 
Source: Philips, Kinniry, The Active-Passive Debate: Market Cyclicality and Leadership Volatility, 
2009, p.5 
 
From the left box of Figure 6 we see that in the 1990s the performance of the 
large-cap growth segment by far exceed all other segments. Hence, the market 
itself outperformed most segments. That said, this scenario also means that the 
market is likely to outperform most active managers as it outperforms the 
segments in the first place. 
By contrast, the right hand side of Figure 6 depicts a different picture of the 
situation in the period ending 2008. As large-cap growth style funds drastically 
underperformed every other style, value and small-cap funds benefited from the 
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fact that the poor performance of the large-cap growth segments reduced 
overall market returns in general. 
In the end, the question for an investor whether to spend money on active 
management or indexing cannot be answered straight away. However, as we 
see from the analysis by Philips and Kinniry the difference in active managers’ 
styles and the size characteristics of their portfolios explain a significant amount 
of out- or underperformance versus a benchmark. The analysis also showed 
that the volatility in the number of funds outperforming a benchmark is directly 
linked to the overall trends in the market.47 
Consequently, investors should be aware of the differences in active 
management fund strategies when choosing an active managed fund as they 
tend to influence outperformance to a great extent. 
 
Most studies about performance focus on equity funds. An exception is the 
research by Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993), which looked into the performance 
of mutual bond funds. Their results showed that bond funds on average 
underperform fixed-income indices by an amount equal to costs48, which is 
consistent with the theory that bond managers operate in an efficient market. 
Although the studies mentioned in this chapter only give a brief overview on the 
research concerning the debate whether active managed funds can and in fact 
do outperform the market, none of them delivers the final prove that active 
management does indeed provide an investor with higher returns than a 
benchmark. However, under certain circumstances, with certain management 
styles or in certain periods of time, active managed portfolios can generate 
higher returns than an indexing strategy. 
 
 
5.2. Skill or Luck 
 
Investing successfully is, like many things in life, a combination of skill and luck. 
However, for an investor it is important to be able to distinguish between the 
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two, as skill is a relative steady feature, while luck by definition is not, and when 
it come to the decision where to invest ones money, one does prefer an 
investment manager with skill, not one who has to rely on being lucky. The 
problem though is, when we just look at a manager’s performance, we cannot 
tell which part was down to skill and which caused by luck, as they are not 
observable independently. 
 
Although Volkman (1999) did not explicitly examine the relationship between 
skill and luck, he looked into fund managers’ abilities concerning market-timing 
and security selection during the 1980s. For this purpose, he used a model, 
which comprised elements of Carhart’s four-factor model (which will be 
explained in more detail in the next chapter on performance persistence) and 
the quadratic-timing-factor model from Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer. To 
measure abnormal fund performance, three methods are used: Jensen’s alpha, 
Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer’s selective measure and a time-adjusted model. 
 
The main results from Volkman’s research indicate a significant perverse timing 
ability of fund managers and there was no evidence for above average 
selectivity performance. The findings also showed a negative correlation 
between a fund’s timing and selectivity performance, which suggests that fund 
managers focus – knowingly or not – on either style (market timing or security 
selection), while neglecting the other.  
Within the study, the effect that three systematic factors (management 
compensation, size, desired risk exposure) have on a fund’s performance was 
also tested. The existence or lack of incentives fees does neither influence 
timing performance nor selectivity performance. Although larger funds manage 
to generate higher returns through security selection, they do not differ from 
smaller funds concerning their timing abilities.49 Generally, Volkman states that 
few funds managed to anticipate market movements during high volatility 
periods, but many funds actually outperform the market through security 
selection, which can be interpreted as managers’ skills. 
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Most research on performance persistence is based on US mutual fund data, 
which makes the results from the paper by Cuthbertson et al. (2007) all the 
more interesting as their sample consists of UK equity mutual funds, although it 
is worth noting that earlier studies on UK mutual funds’ performance gave 
similar results to the studies using US mutual fund data.  
The data sample for the study contains open-end mutual funds in the UK during 
the period from 1975 to 2002, thus one would expect the data to be meaningful 
and less likely to be influenced by market cyclicality given the time span of 
almost 30 years. Rather than assessing the performance of portfolios of funds 
like many other research papers on this topic, the paper focuses on the ex-ante 
performance by individual funds.50 
 
Contrary to earlier studies, which applied traditional statistical measures, the 
paper uses a new approach measuring performance: a cross-section bootstrap 
procedure. The findings by Cuthbertson et al. suggest that there is evidence of 
stock picking skill, but only for the small number of top-ranked mutual funds. 
Although the majority of funds show positive alphas, the results from the 
bootstrap analysis suggest - due to non-significance - that the positive alphas 
are caused rather by luck than skill. Yet, when analysing the results of the worst 
performing funds, the authors find strong evidence that negative abnormal 
performance is caused by insufficient skills, not bad luck. 51 
 
Besides testing the performance of funds for skill versus luck, the authors also 
briefly analyse the results for persistence. They find when ranking funds based 
on their past t-alphas no evidence of future “winner” funds, but instead that 
funds, which had been “losers” in the past will stay “losers”52, which is in tune 
with the findings of Carhart (1997). 
In short, it seems that although many funds deliver positive alphas, it is difficult 
to differentiate between the majority of funds, in which alpha is caused by luck 
from the handful of funds, in which the positive alpha is the result of a fund 
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manager’s ability ex-post. As a conclusion, the authors suggest that given their 
findings investors might be better of choosing index funds rather than active 
managed funds. 
 
 
Barras et al. (2009) started their paper with the suggestion that the key to 
discover these funds that achieve persistent performance is to located these 
“skilled” funds in the estimated alpha distribution. However, as it is not possible 
to observe the alpha of every individual fund, the method use is usually to take 
into account just the funds that have a sufficiently high estimated alpha. The 
shortfall of this method though, is that for a large number of funds in question 
their true alpha is actually zero, thus the estimated alpha is only achieved by 
luck. 
 
To avoid this bias, the authors developed a new method for measuring the skill 
of a portfolio manager. The goal of the “False Discovery Rate” method, as they 
called it, is to determine the number of funds within the overall active managed 
fund universe that have skill. To undermine their assumptions, they used Monte 
Carlo simulations to proof that the only input factor that is needed to measure 
accurately the proportions of skilled and unskilled funds, is the size of funds 
with a zero-alpha among the fund population using the p-values of estimated 
alphas for specific funds.53 
 
The sample used in the paper consisted of more than 2000 actively managed 
US equity mutual funds that were available anytime between 1975 and 2006 
and the main attempt of the study was to look into long-term performance, net 
of costs. The results showed that the overwhelming majority of funds (75.4%) 
had a zero-alpha, meaning that although the managers of these funds were 
able to generate positive returns through their stock picking skills, the fees ate 
up the returns. Only 0.6% of the funds were really skilled, while 24% turned out 
to be unskilled.54 The results also showed that the number of skilled fund 
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managers had decreased significantly over the last 20 years incorporated in the 
study. While in 1990 14.4% of all funds were skilled and only 9.2% did not show 
characteristics of skill, the numbers were drastically reversed in 2006, with only 
0.6% skilled portfolio managers, but 24% unskilled ones. Further analysis 
showed that this revealed that this was caused by an increasing number of 
funds, which charged high costs, but could not show any skill at the same 
time.55 
 
All in all, the findings from Barras et al. show that not only the ability of 
managers to generate above average returns with active management has 
significantly decreased over the last decades, but also that there is less than 
one per cent of funds that has a positive alpha, thus showing true skill. 
 
 
Fama and French (2010) started their research on luck versus skill with the 
concept of equilibrium accounting, a constraint on returns for active investment. 
Basically it means that when returns are measured before costs, passive 
investors will receive passive returns (a zero alpha relative to a passive 
benchmark). Thus, active management is also supposed to have an aggregated 
$ before costs. So, if some active investors manage to achieve a positive $ 
before costs, it has to be at the expense of other active investors. 
 
When it comes to distinguishing skill from luck, previous studies often tested for 
persistence in fund returns to prove that past winners managed to repeat their 
success, thus obviously the portfolio manager in question must be skilled. Yet, 
test for performance persistence have shortfalls, as they rank funds on their 
short-term past performance, there is probably little evidence of persistence in 
the samples because the allocation into winners and losers is likely to be based 
on noise. 
Fama and French use a different approach, they bootstrap simulations of return 
histories of individual fund returns to separate superior fund from inferior ones. 
In detail, they compare cross-sections of fund alpha estimates to the results 
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from the bootstrap simulations, but for the simulations the alpha is set to zero. 
From the comparison of alpha estimates, it should be possible to draw 
conclusions about the existence of skilled managers.56  
 
Results show that for the sample funds from 1984 to 2006, aggregated realized 
net returns underperformed the CAPM as well as the three-factor and four-
factor benchmarks used by Fama and French by roughly the same as the costs. 
The authors concluded if there were fund managers who are actually skilled 
enough to benchmark-adjusted expected returns, which are bigger than the 
costs, they are hidden in the aggregate results, because of the poor 
performance of those managers who lack the necessary skills. 
 
To gain further insight, they also tested individual funds by comparing the 
distribution of alpha estimates from actual fund returns with the returns from the 
bootstrap simulations for which all fund’s alpha was set to zero. Again, the 
results showed that few funds managed to have enough skill to cover the costs. 
However, when testing for gross fund returns - before costs -, Fama and French 
found stronger evidence for manager skills, although it was both positive and 
negative.57 
 
 
Considering all the research on the topic whether active managers outperform 
the market through luck or skill, it seems that they majority of them just got 
lucky. Often, when a fund managed to achieve a positive alpha before costs, 
after the costs and fees are subtracted, the funds are left with a zero-alpha. 
Another interesting fact is the diminishing number of skilled managers over the 
years, because this makes it even harder for an investor to identify those few 
funds with a skilled manager amongst an ever growing number of active 
managed funds.  
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5.3. Performance Persistence through Active Portfolio 
Management 
 
Persistence in performance is an important aspect of asset management, both 
from practical and economic view. From an investor’s point of view, 
performance is a helpful tool in picking these portfolio managers that offer 
above average returns. From the economic perspective, if future returns can be 
predicted from prior-period performance, this represents a major challenge of 
the theory on market efficiency. 
 
As we have established in the previous chapters, there is no conclusive 
evidence that active portfolio management does outperform the market and 
even if it does, it is more likely that the active managers did not beat the market 
due to their skills but because they just got lucky. 
Still, if we allow the possibility that there actually might be some managers who 
do have the ability to outperform others, are these managers able to show their 
skills again and again or is it just a one-off event? 
 
There have been a number of papers that have addressed the topic of 
persistence of performance over the last decades. The first major paper on the 
topic was by Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), who found some 
evidence of persistence. The findings of some major studies on the persistence 
of performance are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Do winners repeat? 
Source: Anderson, Ahmed, Mutual funds, 2005, p.15 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) ask in their work whether past performance 
can be used to predict future relative performance. From their data they found 
support for the hypothesis that winners are able to repeat their win in 
successive periods.58 
 
Brown and Goetzmann (1995) built on the research from Grinblatt and Titman 
as well as from Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser that a fund manager’s track 
record gives information about the future performance. 
Their analysis of fund data showed that 1.304 past winners were repeat 
winners, 1.237 past losers were repeat losers and 1.936 funds changed either 
way. Thus, the majority of funds had persistent performance.  
 
When further looking into the topic of why funds managed to reverse roles – 
from winner to loser or vice versa – Brown and Goetzmann discovered to 
possible explanations. First, persistence is correlated across fund managers, so 
it is likely that persistence is caused by a common strategy, which is not 
captured by risk adjustment procedures or standard stylistic categories. 
Secondly, not all underperforming funds are automatically eliminated from the 
market; though it is very likely they will disappear or merge with others. Hence, 
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patterns of relative persistence are biased because of their inclusion in the 
samples.59 
Given these results, persistence of performance is a useful tool for investors to 
know which funds to seek out and which ones to avoid. 
 
However, they also found that persistence is not the outcome of a winning 
management style each year. In a bid to gain further insight into performance 
persistence, they redefined a winner as a fund, which beats an absolute 
benchmark, not a relative one. For this purpose they choose the S&P 500 as 
benchmark. 
The results showed that absolute repeat-winners and absolute repeat-losers 
followed closely the patterns of relative repeat winners and losers. As can be 
seen from Figure 7 though, over the second half of the sample repeat-losers 
dominate by large. When the results are aggregated, it becomes clear that 
performance persistence is more likely caused by repeat-losers than by repeat-
winners.60 
 
 
Figure 7: Frequency of Repeat Losers and Winners. 
Source: Brown, Goetzmann, Performance persistence, 1995, p.693 
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Malkiel (1995) constructed two-way tables showing successful performance 
over successive periods to analyse the predictability of performance (see 
Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix). He defined a winner as having achieved a rate 
of return over a year that exceeds the median fund return and a loser as one, 
which accomplished a rate of return below the median return. He found that 
there seemed to be considerable persistence of returns in the 1970s. So-called 
“hot hands”, winning followed by winning, occurred much often than a win 
followed by a loss. Overall, winners tended to repeat their success almost 2/3 of 
the time.61 
However, the results for the 1980s tell a different picture. The relationship 
between winners winning again was much weaker than a decade before. Only 
four years out of twelve years examined show a statistically significant 
persistence, for the others persistence is either negative or not significant. 
It is henceforth difficult to conclude that there is predictability in mutual fund 
returns. Malkiel suggests that although persistence may have existed in earlier 
decades, it disappeared since then. Yet, his findings might be the key to the 
puzzle why early research on performance persistence in general found strong 
evidence in favour of active management performance to be persistent over 
time, whereas later studies did not find any strong evidence towards 
performance persistency of active funds. As the studies supporting the 
persistence theory used data from the 1970s, where active funds apparently 
managed to achieve performance persistence, and later research used data 
from later periods, it seems that the outcome of research is highly dependable 
on which data from which period were used. 
 
 
Kahn and Rudd (1995) used style analysis to classify fund when analysing the 
funds’ relative performance to style indices. They measured performance 
persistence by regressing the performance of out-of-sample periods against the 
in-sample performance, where a positive regression slope would indicate 
persistence. Although they found hints of persistence amongst fixed-income 
funds, the results did not show any persistence among equity funds. Hence, 
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Kahn and Rudd concluded that more information other than only historical 
performance figures are needed to select a fund for investment, as historical 
performance only is not significant enough to predict whether a fund will have 
performance persistency or not. 
 
 
Gruber (1996) discovered some hints of persistent performance among mutual 
funds in his research. He concluded that at least in parts future performance 
could be predicted by looking at past performance. He states that “because the 
price at which funds are bought and sold is equal to net asset value and does 
not change to reflect superior management. A group of sophisticated investors 
seems to recognize this, as evidenced by the fact that the flow of new money 
into and out of mutual funds follow the predictors of future performance.”62 
 
According to Gruber, there are two groups of investors, sophisticated ones and 
disadvantaged investors. Disadvantaged investors consist of three groups, 
unsophisticated investors – they are largely influenced by advertising and 
advice from sales people when having to take an investment decision -, 
institutionally disadvantaged investors – they are restricted by certain guidelines 
(often by law) – and tax disadvantaged investors. Gruber concluded that the 
sophisticated investors are able to act on performance predictions and pick 
these mutual funds that offer them above average returns. 
However, although the disadvantage investors might have the same information 
about historical performance and its implication on future performance, due to 
the above-mentioned restrictions they are confined with, disadvantaged 
investors are not able to profit from their knowledge. Thus, they are more likely 
to keep their money in funds, which underperform the benchmark. This means 
that while one would expect bad performing funds to disappear from the market, 
they are in fact not eliminated and are likely to distort results. 
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The paper by Carhart (1997), who kept up on the earlier, often contradictory 
works on fund performance persistence, is one of the most comprehensive 
studies on the topic of performance persistence in recent years. 
He used a sample free of survivor bias of mutual equity funds from1962 to 1993 
and tested performance measurement with two models, the CAPM and a four-
factor model, developed by him. The four-factor model is based on Fama-and 
French’s three-factor model, but Carhart added another dimension, the one-
year momentum anomaly as described by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The 
four-factor model involves excess returns on a market proxy and returns on 
factor-mimicking portfolios, or as Carhart describes it: “a performance attribution 
model, where the coefficients and premia on the factor-mimicking portfolios 
indicate the proportion of mean return attributable to four elementary strategies: 
high versus low beta stocks, large versus small market capitalization stocks, 
value versus growth stocks, and one-year return momentum versus contrarian 
stocks.”63 
 
In a first step, Carhart aggregated funds of portfolios, which are formed on 
lagged one-year returns and then the performance is estimated. Using reported 
returns, which are net of all costs, each year ten equal-weighted portfolio of 
mutual funds are built. The portfolios are held for a year and then regrouped. 
While the four-factor model explained most of the spread among portfolios, the 
CAPM model fails to explain it, as with the CAPM model excess returns 
decreased on the decile portfolios and showed an annual spread of 8% 
compared to 24% in the ranking year. He found that expenses and turnover are 
related to performance and that the tenth decile of funds had higher than 
average expenses and turnover.64 
The results do confirm that there is short-term persistence in equity mutual 
funds, which can be explained with sensitivities to size and momentum factors. 
 
Contrary to previous suggestions, stock-picking skills are not necessary to 
explain persistence over a year long period. If the skills are shown to exist, they 
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might be the result of noise measurement. To avoid this noise in past-
performance rankings, Carhart in a second step regrouped the portfolios on 
lagged two- to five-year returns. Then the previous analysis to examine how 
much of the cross-sectional variation in mean return can be explained by the 
four-factor model and costs is repeated. Over the longer periods, only the funds 
in decile one and those in decile tenth maintained their position more than it 
could be expected to be by random order, but while the top funds only had a 
probability of 17% to stay in the top segment, bottom decile funds had a 
probability of 46% to remain at bottom or disappear altogether.65  
 
As Figure 8 shows while the four-factor model accounts for more than half the 
spread in return on one-year portfolios, its influence decreases for two- to four-
year portfolios and does not explain any of the spread in five-year portfolios. 
Expense ratio has the same effect for all portfolio intervals, with roughly 1%. 
After the four-factor model, expense ratio and transaction costs, around 1.5% of 
the spread in annual excess return is caused by the spread between the ninth 
and tenth decile portfolio.66 
 
                                            ?=!P$7A$7<!&"''(*+!,-(/!??!P$7A$7<!&"''(*+!,,-(>!!
 55 
 
Figure 8: Summary of explanations for persistence in mutual fund performance. 
Source: Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 1997, p.75 
 
Carhart therefore concluded that overall there is little evidence that mutual 
funds beat the market, as most of the funds underperform the market by about 
the same amount as their costs. He also discovered that “expense ratios, 
portfolio turnover, and load fees are significantly and negatively related to 
performance.”67 
 
Moreover, in his paper Carhart highlights a general problem when testing 
market efficiency on the basis of the equilibrium model of returns. It is widely 
accepted that funds with high alphas in the past demonstrate higher alphas and 
expected returns in future periods. Yet, as the same model is used to rank the 
funds in either period, the results gained are sensitive to model 
misspecifications. Thus, even when most funds underperform the market 
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roughly by their costs, the funds with the best past performance appear to be 
able to earn back their costs.68 
 
Although Carhart found some evidence of persistence in performance, the 
results suggest that the majority of persistence is due to transaction costs and 
expenses rather than managerial skill. Yet it should be noted that in fully 
efficient markets there is the possibility of having persistent underperformers, 
while there are no consistently outperformers, as recurrent underperformance is 
not necessarily due to bad management decisions, but can be caused by a 
permanently high expense ratio.69 Similar research by Hendricks, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1993) also showed strong consistency among the worst 
performing funds. 
 
 
Contradictory to earlier research, Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2009) as well 
as Fama and French (2008) found little to no evidence of persistence. 
 
A more recent study on whether investment managers generate superior risk-
adjusted returns and whether this superior performance is persistent was 
conducted by Busse, Goyal and Wahal (2010). They consider their study to be 
the largest sample up to this point that is uncontaminated by survivorship bias, 
as earlier research often was hampered by either survivorship bias or short-time 
series. 
 
In accordance with mutual fund literature, they followed the approach of 
assessing performance by estimating factor models cross-sectionally using 
times-series regression and by constructing equal- and value-weighted 
aggregate portfolios.70 
Busse, Goyal and Wahal concluded that there was little evidence of superior 
performance, either on average or in aggregate. Still, it is possible for some 
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portfolio managers to deliver above-average returns over long time spans, even 
when the verification of aggregate superior performance is missing. 
Another important finding of their work, though, is that the estimate of 
persistence is sensitive to the model used for research, as the three-factor 
models used in the study showed modest evidence of persistence, however, 
the four-factor models that contain the effects of stock momentum did not show 
persistence. Same results were gained using conditional four-factor models and 
seven-factor models. 
 
The findings of Busse, Goyal and Wahal are significant for both, economic and 
practical aspects, as they show that in the context of efficient markets the 
implications of possible outperformance clearly depend on the benchmark used 
to compare the returns to. For an investor, the implications are also clear: if he 
or she is happy with the CAPM model or a three-factor model as a tool for the 
benchmark, he or she might conclude that investment managers deliver 
superior returns with persistence, however, if the investor favours a different 
model as benchmark, incorporating momentum into the analysis, he or she will 
not be contempt with the performance.71 
 
 
In general, data on US mutual funds seem to suggest that it is quite difficult and 
probably even impossible for an investor to pick funds, which offer superior 
future performance in the long run. Exceptions are only possible if the portfolio 
is rebalanced often and if the timeframe for which performance is measured is 
shorter than a year, as numerous studies have shown (e.g. Grinblatt and 
Titman (1992), Carhart (1997), Wermers (2003)). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this diploma thesis was to answer the question, whether active 
portfolio management can generate performance persistence.  
 
Research on performance persistence has so far delivered ambiguous results. 
At the beginning of the research is the question, whether active managed 
portfolios even manage to outperform their benchmark, whether active 
portfolios are able to beat their passive counterparts, because if there were no 
evidence for the superiority of active performance, there would not be any need 
to look into the topic of its persistence. If something is not even there, it 
definitively cannot be persistent. 
As it was disclosed earlier, numerous studies have dealt with the topic of active 
versus passive portfolio management. All in all, their findings give no absolute 
proof that active management does indeed outperform passive managed 
portfolios. It seems that outperformance of a benchmark depends to a large 
extend on the chosen data and benchmark itself. The other issue that should 
not be overlooked is the problem of survivorship bias within the data that tends 
to distort performance results, if it is not considered properly in the data 
samples. 
 
 
Another important aspect of the debate on active performance is, whether the 
performance was caused by the manager’s skill or just by luck, because if the 
outperformance was simply due to a manager’s luck, not the skill, he or she is 
most likely not able to repeat it. Thus an investor could not rely on any past 
performance of an investor to predict any future outperformance correctly as the 
future performance would be random and not correlated to the past. The 
majority of research papers included in this diploma thesis does not find any 
strong evidence supporting the theory that portfolio managers are actually 
skilled. Especially when looking at net returns – returns adjusted for costs – 
most funds have at best a zero-alpha, so any possible outperformance 
generated by a skilled manager costs an investor roughly the same amount, so 
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in the end an investor is no better off with an active managed fund than with a 
passive one. 
While research so far suggests that active outperformance is down to a portfolio 
managers’ luck, it is quite the opposite for underperforming funds. They lose 
money not because of bad luck, but because their managers are lacking the 
necessary skills. 
Barras et al. discovered an interesting aspect that is worth pointing out: that the 
number of skilled managers diminished quite significantly over the years. This 
means that although an investor has probably more active managed fund to 
choose from today than ever before, it also means that it is harder than in 
previous periods to actually identify the few that are skilled. 
 
 
Besides the limited existence of skill, the data of more recent studies also do 
not show real proof for the existence of persistence in the performance of active 
managed funds. At best, performance persistence was found in the very short-
term, but beyond a time horizon of a year, there is no significant existence of 
persistent outperformance. Somewhat contrary to these recent findings are the 
results from the earliest studies on the topic, which found evidence that funds 
that have performed well in the past managed to repeat their success. Possible 
explanations for this contradiction might be the different benchmarks that were 
used to measure outperformance against, the different space of times that were 
covered by the studies or more refined models. Overall, current literature on the 
topic strongly favours the idea that performance persistence of active managed 
portfolios is not possible on the long run. 
 
 
Given these discouraging results on the performance of active managed funds, 
a number of studies were puzzled, why these funds are still so popular amongst 
investors despite a track record that is not in their favour and investors today 
are offered an interesting alternative with an ever growing number of index 
funds. This apparent paradox was explained to some extend by legal 
restrictions investors have to deal with, but to a larger extend with the theory 
that investors might only look at performance before costs, which often does 
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give the impression that a fund managed to beat the market due to its 
manager’s skill, thus leaving an investor with a distorted with of real net 
performance. 
A common denominator of all the research so far on the performance of active 
managed funds is that it almost exclusively deals with equity mutual funds and 
the sample are even more restricted to US mutual funds. While this 
phenomenon could be explained by the accessibility of data, it does not quite 
accurately reflect everyday reality. In practice it is very unlikely that a portfolio of 
an individual private investor or a financial services company like an insurance 
company is only limited to investments into equity funds while neglecting all 
other asset classes. Even research into active bond portfolio management is 
rare. 
 
Results into active performance persistence might also be biased due to the 
sample data usually consisting only of US funds. Although it is comprehensible 
that the majority of previous studies relied on US fund data because of their 
availability – especially over long-term periods – and their undoubtedly larger 
sample size, which certainly helps to avoid the limitations that one might 
encounter with a smaller sample where there is always the danger of results not 
being meaningful enough to state any generalisations based on the results, 
results might deliver a skewed view on performance persistence. Although it is 
legitimate to doubt that data covering other geographical regions like Europe or 
Asia might result in significantly different results, it would certainly help 
validating the US fund performance results. 
 
 
Although all results so far point to the direction that active managed portfolios 
are not able to generate persistent performance, the final verdict on the topic is 
not yet delivered. Further research in the future with new or more refined 
models for analysis, new data samples or a longer time span might probably 
provide the asset management universe with a final proof that active 
management is persistent or not. But whatever way the discussion will take, 
there is definitively plenty of room for future research on the topic that might 
result in some astonishing findings.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Performance Data 
 
 
 
Table 3: Average Monthly Performance 
Source: Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 1996, p.788 
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Table 4: Tests of Persistence of Fund Performance: 1970s Data. 
Source: Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971-1991, 1995, p.560 
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Table 5: Tests of Persistence of Fund Performance: 1980s Data. 
Source: Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971-1991, 1995, p.561 
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Appendix B: Abstract in German 
 
Die Diplomarbeit untersucht die Nachhaltigkeit von aktivem 
Portfoliomanagement. Unter Nachhaltigkeit ist im Kontext dieser Diplomarbeit 
zu verstehen, dass die Wertentwicklung eines aktiv gemanagten Portfolios 
wiederholt Überschussrenditen erzielt gegenüber einem Vergleichsportfolio. Zu 
Beginn werden einige Grundkonzepte der Kapitalmarkttheorie erläutert, vor 
allem die Effizienzmarkthypothese und das Capital Asset Pricing Model. Ein 
Überblick über die Methoden und Instruments, die zur Performancemessung 
verwendet werden, wird ebenfalls gegeben. Weiter wird das Thema anhand von 
drei Aspekten abgehandelt: Vergleich zwischen der Wertentwicklung von aktiv 
und passiv gemanagten Portfolien, Unterscheidung zwischen Können und 
Glück, auf die die Wertentwicklung zurückzuführen ist und der Möglichkeit, 
wiederholt eine bessere Wertentwicklung zu erzielen als der Markt. Zu diesem 
Zweck wird eine historische Betrachtung der wichtigsten Studien über die 
Wertentwicklung von aktivem Portfoliomanagement durchgeführt. Die 
Ergebnisse der Studien, die in der Diplomarbeit behandelt werden, weisen stark 
darauf hin, dass eine nachhaltige Wertentwicklung von aktiv gemanagten 
Portfolios langfristig nicht möglich ist. Schließlich werden noch die 
Einschränkungen der bisherigen Forschung aufgezeigt und Empfehlungen für 
zukünftige Forschungsfragen abgegeben. 
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